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INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS GROUP

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Prompted by a US-Australian request, the Security Council opened discussion on renewed Dutch "police action" against the Indonesian Republic in violation of the August 1947 UN truce agreement. Rejection of the Israeli membership application, despite added support by Argentina and Colombia, resulted from failure to gain more than five affirmative SC votes. The narrow currency aspects of the Berlin dispute are still under study on an expert level by the committee of six SC "neutrals." The sixteen ERP nations reportedly estimated their 1949-50 dollar requirements to be under \$4,300,000,000 -- a figure over a half billion dollars below the 1948-49 dollar aid.

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A Outlook for SC Indonesian discussion. Although renewed Dutch "police action" against the Indonesian Republic directly violates the 1947 UN truce, it is doubtful whether the Security Council will be able to halt present military operations. A new cease-fire order, providing for the release of captured Republican officials and for the withdrawal of Netherlands troops to the previous status quo lines, is the utmost which can be initially expected. Although the Dutch have indicated willingness to accept a cease-fire once their objective is gained, they are unlikely to comply at this time and any attempt to force obedience would require sanctions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The role of the Netherlands in Benelux, Western Union, the proposed North Atlantic Pact and the European Recovery Program will influence any decision of the US, UK, France and Belgium to support even limited economic sanctions. Were the Dutch confronted with resolute SC pressure such as a complete embargo, they would probably be compelled to yield. Beyond bitter expressions of resentment, they could do little except choose between isolation and eastern orientation. The latter is unthinkable and the former practically impossible.

In voting sanctions, the SC would split along colonial and anti-colonial lines. The USSR, Ukraine, China and the Arab representative will undoubtedly approve. The decisive Latin American position is undetermined but Cuba (a Council member after 1 January) is likely to favor stronger measures than will Argentina. A French veto constitutes the major threat to a vote for sanctions. A staunch colonial power, France could never approve such economic pressure. On the other hand, a veto would further aggravate its difficulties in the Far East and in North Africa. While supporting a cease-

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fire, the UK will oppose the use of sanctions, but will probably abstain in view of the violent pro-Republican sentiments of its Asian dominions -- Australia, New Zealand, India, Ceylon and Pakistan. Canada is likely to follow suit. Belgium, until its replacement on the Council by Norway in January, will stoutly defend the Netherlands. The Norwegians favor moves strengthening the UN and hence will probably support punitive measures against the Dutch. Meanwhile, outside the SC, the entire Near, Middle and Far East has become aroused against the Dutch (for details on foreign reaction see FE/P Branch Weekly No. 32 dated 30 December). These states, together with the Slav nations, would form a strong bloc should inability to obtain effective action in the SC lead to discussion of the case by the General Assembly at its April meeting.

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A Comparative resources of Communist and non-Communist labor in the struggle for control of Western European manpower. The intensified struggle between Communist and non-Communist labor in ECA-receiving countries, particularly in France and Italy, indicates that the Communist labor organizations enjoy certain marked advantages in organizing the labor forces of these countries. For the present, at least, they are able to draw upon greater reserves of: (1) money, (2) "hard core" trained organizers and (3) available newsprint and office supplies. These advantages are attributable in large measure to the demonstrated ability of the USSR to furnish both open and covert aid to those labor and political organizations which it regards as strategic instruments of its foreign policy. During the French coal strike, Soviet and Satellite trade unions openly raised and made available to the striking CGT miners steadily mounting sums in French francs. In addition to such open aid channels, the USSR reportedly has had at its disposal the Banque Commerciale pour l'Europe du Nord as well as outwardly legitimate commercial firms in France and Switzerland through which it can siphon funds to Communist unions. In contrast, the non-Communist national labor organizations, such as the French Force Ouvriere and the Italian LCGIL, receive only limited financial assistance from the free trade union movements of the Western Hemisphere. The dues-paying members of the American AFL and CIO, for example, have not been in a position to make contributions matching those thrown into the struggle by instrumentalities of the Soviet Government and its satellites.

This disparity between the foreign support received by the Social Democratic and Communist labor forces in Western Europe has been an important factor in the retarded capabilities of the Western-oriented trade unions for resistance to Communist-sponsored strikes and sabotage of production. To offset substantial support of the kind sent from Soviet sources to aid the French coal strike, Western European labor urgently requires comparable assistance from its allies. The failure of the French Communist miners to achieve all their objectives cannot be laid to inadequate foreign support since substantial aid was promptly extended. Whenever the next Communist blow at the European Recovery Program is launched, material assistance from Soviet and Satellite sources will be on an even larger scale.

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Future UN role in Berlin dispute. Although events in Berlin have overtaken the six SC "neutrals" deliberations on the currency problem, SC mediation on broader lines may still be utilized to effect a settlement based upon the existing fait accompli. Should mediation be impossible, any other ultimate adjustment will probably be channelled through the UN. The "neutrals" are still grappling, at expert level, with the currency aspects of the problem, although creation of separate East and West city governments has diminished the importance of their immediate task in relation to the entire dispute. Nevertheless, the SC is still seized of the Berlin case and it is improbable that the Western Powers will move to drop the matter from the agenda. Remote as the prospects of ever settling the dispute may now appear, the SC would still provide the most appropriate forum in which to conclude an adjustment should the parties ever seriously seek to revive the idea of settlement.

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Effect of change in SC membership. Replacement in the SC of Belgium, Syria and Colombia by Norway, Egypt and Cuba on 1 January may somewhat alter the political alignment but will not materially damage US interests. Norway's replacement of Belgium, a staunch colonial, pro-Western power, will have the most effect. On issues such as Indonesia, Norway will be more sympathetic to the native nationalists than to the metropolitan powers. On questions involving East-West differences, Norway may, because of its strategic location and its proximity to the USSR, prove less outspoken than Belgium but will probably not imperil the heretofore solid 9-2 majority against the East. A hardening of the Norwegian attitude was evident during the past year. If reassured by prospective US aid, Norway may become even firmer in its adherence to the Western bloc. The appointment of Arne Lunde, self-styled Anglophile with no delusions about Communism, as SC representative will strengthen this western alignment.

Syria's replacement by Egypt will have little effect beyond depriving the SC of that able and colorful figure, Faris El Khouri. Egypt's sensitive ex-colonial attitude may, however, be injected in cases involving occupation by foreign troops of more or less sovereign states such as Greece, Iran, Korea, etc. -- an issue on which Egypt has consistently sided with the USSR. Less intransigent than the Syrians and giving some indications of a growing pro-British sentiment, the Egyptians may weaken the Arab position on Palestine. A more conciliatory attitude by the Arabs would improve chances for a peaceful Palestine settlement. Cuba will enter the Council with a pro-Franco, pro-Italian bias, but since the Spanish question is of minor significance, particularly to the SC, and the Italian colonies question is on the GA agenda, these aspects of its foreign policy will not assume great significance in the near future. Exaggerated nationalistic pride may at times make Cuba oversensitive toward receiving US suggestions but on major divisions the US position will generally be followed.

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Creation of European council and assembly likely. Establishment of a

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European council of ministers and a consultative assembly, likely to be recommended by the Western Union powers in January, may represent the first concrete step toward a broader and closer European political unity. In the first official inter-governmental move to examine this problem, the Brussels Pact nations last October organized a Permanent Committee for the Study and Development of European Federation. This action resulted directly from a Franco-Belgian request to consider the Congress of Europe's proposal for a European consultative assembly elected by the member parliaments and probably from a general desire to convince the US that European unification is progressing. The Committee has faced the task of reconciling conflicting French and UK approaches. The UK, hesitant about creating new bodies with no real power and preferring a gradual pragmatic approach, favors establishing a Council of Europe, consisting of ministers from member states, to meet at regular intervals and discuss common problems. The British are concerned lest any assembly selected on a representative basis from the various parliaments, especially the French and Italian, would have to include Communist members. France, on the other hand, attaches little value to a Council alone because it would merely reflect narrow national interests and be unable to treat problems from a broad European viewpoint. The Committee appears prepared to reconcile these problems by recommending both a council and an assembly. Membership would be open to all Western European countries except Spain but would, at the outset, probably exclude Greece and Turkey. To avoid the danger of Communist representation, the delegates may be selected by their Governments. Although any such organization would, in its initial stages, be limited to discussion and recommendation, it could provide the framework for a common approach to intra-European political problems and a basis for later expansion.

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Relationship of US military aid to Atlantic Pact membership. The willingness of such countries as Denmark, Norway and probably Italy and Eire to enter any Atlantic Pact will to some degree depend on the extent of concrete US aid which each may anticipate receiving. Consequently these states will closely scan presidential budget estimates and Congressional debates dealing with (a) any lend-lease program and (b) the US arms budget, since US military potential, too, will determine the effectiveness of any Atlantic security bloc. Should the peripheral countries be led to believe little is forthcoming in the way of assistance, they may feel there is not much to be gained in committing themselves to an Atlantic Pact.

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